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The way diseases spread through schools, epidemics through countries, and viruses through the
Internet is crucial in determining their risk. Although each of these threats has its own character-
istics, its underlying network determines the spreading. To restrain the spreading, a widely used
approach is the fragmentation of these networks through immunization, so that epidemics cannot
spread. Here we develop an immunization approach based on optimizing the susceptible size, which
outperforms the best known strategy based on immunizing the highest-betweenness links or nodes.
We find that the network’s vulnerability can be significantly reduced, demonstrating this on three
different real networks: the global flight network, a school friendship network, and the internet.
In all cases, we find that not only is the average infection probability significantly suppressed, but
also for the most relevant case of a small and limited number of immunization units the infection
probability can be reduced by up to 55%.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 87.19.Xx, 64.60.aq, 64.60.ah
I. INTRODUCTION
Every few years a potential global pandemic like severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or swine flu occurs
[1]. Nowadays there is a possibility to reach every city
in the world within at most a day, which allows for the
evolution of a local disease to a global pandemic [2–8].
Crucial for fast global disease spreading is the interna-
tional flight network [9, 10]. To avoid spreading through
this network, significant effort is made by, e.g., screening
passengers or canceling flights. Since it is unrealistic to
examine all passengers, it is vital to apply the best pos-
sible immunization strategy in order to most effectively
exploit limited resources, like available vaccines and man
power.
Different strategies to immunize nodes or links of a net-
work have been studied in the past [11–16]. Targeted
immunization strategies, in which nodes or links playing
a special role in the network architecture are immunized
first, have proven to be very effective [17–20]. The strat-
egy believed to be the most efficient is the targeted immu-
nization based on immunizing the highest betweenness
centrality nodes or links [17]. The adaptive betweenness
centrality is the number of shortest paths passing through
the node or the link, recalculated for the network of non
immunized nodes at each step of the immunization pro-
cess.
Here we show that in fact this strategy is not optimal
and a significantly more efficient immunization strategy
exists. This is important since improving the effective-
ness of immunization strategies even by a small amount
can result in saving thousands of human lives.
Based on percolation we developed a more efficient immu-
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nization strategy using the betweenness centrality mea-
sure [17]. We studied quantitatively the effectiveness
of the improved strategy on real networks, the global
airport network [21], the friendship network in Ameri-
can schools [22], and the internet at the level of service
providers (point of presence, PoP) [23], as well as on
model networks. We study both cases of immunization,
the immunization of nodes, which models, for instance,
immunization of people or airports, and the immuniza-
tion of links, modeling, for instance, prevention of di-
rect contact between people or the performance of spe-
cial checks and vaccinations on all flights between two
specific airports. We find that, although very effective,
the immunization strategy based on immunizing nodes
or edges with the highest values of dynamically recalcu-
lated betweenness is not optimal. Starting from such a
strategy, our approach reduces the risk of becoming in-
fected on average by more than 10%, independent of the
amount of immunization units for the real examples of
airport, friendship, and internet networks. Moreover, for
specific numbers of immunization units the improvement
is even up to 55%. For model networks, the improvement
is close to 30% on average, and a maximal improvement
of over 80% can be obtained or up to 29% of immuniza-
tion units can be saved.
The effectiveness of our approach is illustrated in Fig.
1, where we compare the disease spreading (based on
the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model [2]) in the
global airport network immunized at random (left), us-
ing the high betweenness based link immunization strat-
egy (middle) [17], which is already significantly better,
and finally using our developed strategy (right), which
is more than 40% more effective than the recalculated
high-betweenness method. In all cases the same number
of links (flights) are immunized. The color code rep-
resents the probability that the node becomes infected,
going from green (dark gray, right) for low probability
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2FIG. 1. (Color online) The simulation of an epidemic using the SIR model with α = 0.2 and β = 0.05 for the global airline
network, starting from a single randomly infected node. To suppress the spreading of the disease, a small number of q = 0.09
flights are immunized according to a random (left), betweenness (middle), and improved (right) strategy. The color code
represents the probability of becoming infected. Note that the average probability of becoming infected is 84% for random,
34% for betweenness, and 20% for our improved immunization method. The reduction of the infection probability is due to
the efficient decoupling of the regions; thus passengers are screened on their journey between these regions, e.g., from China to
Europe.
The picture is created with pajek [28].
over yellow (light gray, right) and orange (gray, middle)
to red (dark gray, left) for very high probability of in-
fection. While for the random case many immunization
units are wasted, the betweenness based strategy sup-
presses the spreading from certain regions to the back-
bone of the network. Nevertheless, our improved strat-
egy is more efficient in identifying these regions and thus
more efficient in suppressing diseases. For example the
two large jumps at 9% and 12% of immunized edges in
Fig. 2(a) correspond to the decoupling of East Asia from
Central America, Europe, and the United States (2336
vs 2503 immunized edges) and the decoupling of Europe
from America (3169 vs 3192 immunized edges), respec-
tively.
II. METHODS
We use the susceptible size of the network that could
be infected as the performance measure of the immuniza-
tion procedure. A good immunization strategy should
make such a susceptible size as small as possible. The
susceptible size R is defined here as the sum of the sizes
of the largest connected clusters S(q) of the networks of
non immunized nodes remaining after immunization of q
nodes or edges:
R =
1
(N + 1)N
N∑
q=0
S(q), (1)
where N is the size of the network [27]. This measure
captures the network response to immunization through-
out the whole immunization process, and not only on the
percolation threshold at which the network of non immu-
nized nodes becomes disconnected.
In our search for a more efficient immunization strategy
of nodes or edges, we start from the efficient known strat-
egy of high betweenness. First, we calculate the sequence
in which nodes or edges would be immunized if the high-
betweenness adaptive (HBA) immunization strategy [17]
was used. To this end, we calculate the shortest path
between all pairs of nodes and count how often a node or
edge lies on a shortest path. This number defines its be-
tweenness centrality. The node or edge with the highest
contribution to the shortest paths is identified and im-
munized. Repeating this procedure with the remaining
network of non immunized nodes until it vanishes leads
to the high-betweenness immunization sequence.
To improve this immunization strategy, we modify the
initial, high-betweenness-based, immunization sequence
using the following algorithm. We choose two nodes or
edges randomly, switch the order in which they are im-
munized, and recalculate the susceptible size R, Eq. (1),
according to the new sequence. If the susceptible size
does not increase when the new immunization sequence
is used, the change in the sequence is accepted. The
sequence is further improved by repeating the same pro-
cedure many times.
To further improve our strategy, we use in addition an
improving algorithm employing a population of immu-
nization sequences. We start from 1000 equal high-
betweenness immunization sequences and choose one of
them randomly to perform a swap. If the susceptible size
of the network after immunizing with the new sequence
is not increased, it replaces the sequence from the popu-
lation for which the network has the highest susceptible
size. The final immunization sequence is the one with
the lowest susceptible size. The basic algorithm for im-
proving edge immunization sequences is demonstrated in
Fig. 3.
Note that the algorithm uses the global knowledge of the
network to achieve the final immunization sequence. The
calculation of the initial sequence, which is based on the
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Comparison between the two edge immunization strategies, betweenness based (full line) and our
improved immunization (dashed line). Plotted is the probability of becoming infected, p, for (a) the global airline network
(N = 3666 and M = 27235), (b) a school friendship network (N = 1461 and M = 3875), and (c) the PoP internet network
(N = 1098 and M = 6089) as a function of the immunized edge fraction q. Both betweenness-based and improved immunization
can reduce the spreading of diseases significantly. Nevertheless, for practical cases of small fractions of immunized edges, the
improved strategy is significantly more efficient. In the insets the savings of immunization units obtained from our immunization
strategy are shown. We compare the number of immunization units required to keep the fraction of affected nodes under a
certain value and plot the relative number of saved units vs the maximal size of the spreading, s. The average savings are
17.8%, 9%, and 21.2% for the airline, school, and internet networks, respectively.
FIG. 3. (Color online) Illustration of improving the edge im-
munization strategy. Starting from an initial immunization
sequence (based on betweenness centrality), two randomly
chosen edges (in this case the edge between nodes 5 and 9 and
the edge between 3 and 7) are swapped in the immunization
sequence. If the swap does not increase the susceptible size R
of the network, it is kept; otherwise the swap is withdrawn.
betweenness centrality, and the optimization strategy are
computationally costly; thus our algorithm scales usually
much more slowly than linearly with system size. Nev-
ertheless, we are able to obtain immunization sequences
for networks with up to N = 8000 nodes and M = 16000
edges in a reasonable time.
III. RESULTS: REAL NETWORKS
To study our improved immunization strategy, we an-
alyze its efficiency on two real network examples through
which epidemics are spread, namely, the global airline
network [9, 21] and school friendship networks [22]. We
also analyze the case of the internet at the level of point-
of-presence as well as two models, the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi net-
works [24] and scale-free networks [25] generated using
the configurational model [26]. For a typical friendship
network we show the results for a single school, since we
found that the other 81 school networks we studied all
behave in a qualitatively similar way. For all real net-
works we demonstrate the efficiency of our method for
both link (Fig. 2) and node immunization (Fig. 5).
For the airline network, an infected airport implies that
sick people arrive at or depart from it. Consequently im-
munization means identifying sick people and inhibiting
their travel. For example, link immunization can be done
by screening people on specific flights - as done in several
countries (including Japan and China) during the SARS
and swine flu epidemics - while in the case of node im-
munization all people at an airport are screened. A more
drastic immunization would be the canceling of flights
or even the shut down of entire airports. For the school
network, link immunization corresponds to preventing di-
rect contacts between students and node immunization
can be performed by immunizing students or temporar-
ily removing them from classes. For the internet, the
screening of traffic between routers is equivalent to link
immunization and the upgrade of the router soft- or hard-
ware to node immunization.
The efficiency of our method for improving immunization
is evaluated by three different measures: modeling epi-
demic spreading using the SIR model, the saved immu-
nization doses, and the susceptible size, which represents
the upper limit of the number of infected individuals.
First we analyze the probability for a single node (airport,
student, router) to become infected. To study this proba-
bility we simulate a disease spreading model (SIR) on the
4global airline transportation network with N = 3666 air-
ports and M = 27235 flight connections, a typical friend-
ship network with N = 1461 students and M = 3875
friendship connections, and the internet with N = 1098
and M = 6089 connections. We simulate the SIR model
[2, 5] with the parameters α = 0.2 (probability that the
infection spreads from an infected node to its neighbor
in one time step) and β = 0.05 (probability that a node
recovers in a unit time step) starting from a single ran-
dom infected node and averaging over 10000 independent
runs.
In Fig. 2(a) we show the dependence of the infection
probability on the fraction of immunized flights for air-
ports. The full line is the probability of becoming in-
fected in the largest connected cluster after immunizing
or removing a fraction q of edges, according to the high-
betweenness immunization strategy. The dashed line cor-
responds to our improved immunization strategy. Thus,
the green (light gray) area represents the improvement.
For the most practical case of a small number of immu-
nized flights, the improved immunization strategy is sig-
nificantly more efficient, while for large q the two strate-
gies have nearly similar effects. Figure 2(b) shows the
probability that a student becomes infected as a function
of the percentage of suppressed contacts, and Fig. 2(c)
shows the dependency of the probability that a router
becomes infected on the percentage of controlled connec-
tions. Qualitatively, in all cases a similar improvement
is observed for improved immunization. For the airline
network, the average improvement is about 15% for im-
munization fractions less than 20%, while the maximal
improvement is about 55% for q ≈ 11.9%. For the school
network an average improvement of about 7% for im-
munization fractions less than 20% is obtained with a
maximal improvement of 45% for q ≈ 9.4%. In the case
of the internet the average improvement is 15% for fewer
than 20% controlled connections and the maximal im-
provement is 24% for q ≈ 8%. Note that the simulations
are for a highly contagious illness or virus. Results for
less contagious ones are shown for the airline network in
Fig. 4.
Not only is the probability for a single person to become
infected of interest, but also the maximal possible spread-
ing size is crucial. Therefore, we analyze the change of
the largest connected cluster of non immunized nodes
during the immunization process, a measure of the net-
work’s susceptible size. The size of this cluster gives the
upper limit of the number of people that could become
infected if the disease spreading starts on a node in this
cluster. An efficient immunization strategy should keep
this number as small as possible in all steps of the im-
munization process.
In the insets of Fig. 2 we show the possible savings of
immunization units with our strategy. To reduce the
maximal spreading size to a certain value s, our strat-
egy needs significantly fewer units than the betweenness-
based strategy . On average the potential savings are 9%
(school), 17.9% (airline), and 21.2% (PoP).
Our strategy is more efficient not only for edge immu-
nization, but also for immunization of nodes. The results
for node immunization for the same three networks are
shown in Fig. 5. For the airline network, the average im-
provement is about 11% for immunization fractions less
than 7%, while the maximal improvement is about 49%
for q ≈ 3.3%. For the school network, an average im-
provement of about 8% for immunization fractions less
than 20% is obtained with a maximal improvement of
34% for q ≈ 18.5%. In the case of the internet the av-
erage improvement is 12% for fewer than 10% controlled
connections and the maximal improvement is 34% for
q ≈ 8%. The average possible savings are 18%, 7.2%,
and 9.6% for the airline, school, and internet networks,
respectively.
IV. RESULTS: MODEL NETWORKS
To verify that the improvements are not only finite
size effects, we study different model networks with
different numbers of nodes and edges. In Fig. 6(a),
the efficiency of our method is shown on the example
of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with N = 8000 nodes and
M = 16000 edges (〈k〉 = 4). The full line is the fraction
of nodes in the largest connected cluster after removing
a fraction q of edges, according to the high betweenness
immunization strategy and the dashed line corresponds
to our improved immunization strategy. Not only is
the overall improvement of R about 30% (see inset of
Fig. 6(a)), but also the largest component that can be
infected is reduced by up to a factor of 5 compared to
high-betweenness immunization for the practical case
of a small number of available immunization doses. In
the inset, the size dependence of the improvement of
edge immunization is shown for the three real networks,
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, and scale-free networks with
γ = 2.5. The improvement is calculated by the relative
reduction of the susceptible size. Interestingly, the larger
the system, the better the improvement.
In Fig. 6(b) we demonstrate the efficiency of our method
on a scale-free network with N = 4000 nodes and an
exponent γ = 2.5. Here we immunize the nodes of the
network instead of the edges among them. Although, in
general, the efficiency of our method is higher in the case
of edge immunization, the overall improvement of R, in
this case, is about 6%. The size dependence, shown in
the inset, is similar to that for edge immunization for
both model and real networks. We have also investigated
the effect of the density of edges (degree) in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
networks on the improvement and found that it has no
major impact on the efficiency of our strategy.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Comparison between the two immunization strategies, betweenness based (full line), and our improved
immunization (dashed line), for different infection parameters α. Plotted is the probability of becoming infected, p, for link
immunization in the global airline network as a function of the immunized fraction q for (a) α = 0.1, (b) α = 0.025, and (c)
α = 0.0125. For the practical cases of low fractions of immunized edges or nodes, our improved strategy is more efficient for all
studied α values. In the insets the relative improvement of our method is shown.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Comparison between the two node immunization strategies, betweenness based (full line) and our
improved immunization (dashed line). Plotted is the probability of becoming infected, p, for (a) the global airline network
(N = 3666 and M = 27235), (b) a school friendship network (N = 1461 and M = 3875), and (c) the PoP internet network
(N = 1098 and M = 6089) as a function of the immunized node fraction q. Both betweenness-based and improved immunization
can reduce the spreading of diseases significantly. Nevertheless, for practical cases of small fractions of immunized nodes, the
improved strategy is significantly more efficient. In the insets the savings of immunization units obtained using our immunization
strategy are shown. We compare the number of immunization units required to keep the fraction of affected nodes under a
certain value and plot the relative number of saved units vs the maximal size of the spreading, s. The average savings are 18%,
7.2%, and 9.6% for the airline, school, and internet networks, respectively.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we introduced a different approach for de-
termining an efficient immunization strategy. We showed
that our method is significantly more efficient in prevent-
ing disease spreading compared to the high-betweenness
method, which was so far believed to be the most ef-
ficient. Our method outperforms other immunization
strategies for both node and link immunization. We
showed this by studying three different performance mea-
sures, the average infection probability of SIR model dis-
eases, the susceptible size, and the relative number of
saved immunization doses. All of these three measure-
ments indicate that the immunization significantly im-
proves with our strategy for all networks studied. Such
improvement could result in the saving of many human
lives and resources. For the most important network
responsible for global disease spreading, the global air-
line network, we showed that with our approximated ap-
proach the disease spread may be reduced significantly
with a relatively small effort. Moreover, we found that
the efficiency of our strategy increases with system size.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Demonstration that betweenness-based immunization can be significantly improved for (a) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
(ER) network with N = 8000 and M = 16000 where the links are immunized and (b) a scale-free (SF) network with N = 4000
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in the insets as well as the results for the three real networks (RN). Our results show that the bigger the network the larger
the improvement of our approach.
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